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 Non-technical summary  
Many new firms do not survive the first years in business. Even though, the financial risk 
for the parties that have a financial stake in the business (i.e. owners, lending institutions 
and other creditors, such as suppliers) is misleadingly exaggerated by the high closure 
rates among start-ups: not all start-ups cease operations with a financial loss, nor does 
closure – in the event of loss –necessarily entail financial pain for every party. 
 Closures happen, for example, because owners pursue opportunities for alterna-
tive earnings, such as salaried employment, alternative self-employment or retirement. 
Yet the decision to pursue alternatives is influenced by costs considerations: low oppor-
tunity or high switching costs should increase the probability of a business owner staying 
in a current business – possibly longer than advisable, which would predict a higher like-
lihood of financial loss at closure. In contrast to voluntary closures, the link between clo-
sure due to bankruptcy or other financial problems with financial loss is obvious. As a 
consequence, business closure because of bankruptcy should basically be more likely to 
produce losses than voluntary closure. 
 Owing to their different relationships to a business, creditors are subject to vary-
ing probabilities of incurring financial loss. These probabilities depend, for example, in 
part on informational asymmetries, as not all creditors are privy to the same information 
about the business and the measures used by these creditors to treat their information 
deficit. Theoretical arguments suggest that also the reasons for closure affect the finan-
cial risk. The central purpose of this paper is thus to test how different reasons for busi-
ness closure determine who suffers financial loss at closure. 
 Using data from the ZEW Entrepreneurship Study (a unique dataset on business 
closures in Germany), we determined that closures that take place based on expectations 
about a business’ future development or because the owner takes a different earning 
opportunity are less likely to entail losses for creditors. Conversely, closures because of 
financial problems are correlated with a higher loss probability for involved parties. The 
findings in this paper have important implications for both entrepreneurs and creditors. 
They suggest that creditors should help debtors to assess business prospects in order to 
limit their own loss risk. Such assistance, of course, is also in the interest of entrepre-
neurs themselves – particularly those who would seek to pursue a new business venture. 
When an entrepreneur leads a lending institution to suffer losses, the likelihood that he 
will be able to obtain a new loan for a fresh start drops significantly. 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Viele neue Unternehmen überstehen die ersten Jahre nach ihrer Gründung nicht. Die ho-
he Schließungsrate überzeichnet jedoch das Risiko für alle am Unternehmen finanziell 
Beteiligten (wie Unternehmer, Kreditgeber und Lieferanten), da weder jede Unterneh-
mensschließung mit finanziellen Verlusten einhergeht, noch Verluste alle Beteiligten glei-
chermaßen treffen würden. 
 Unternehmen werden geschlossen, beispielsweise, weil Unternehmer andere Ein-
kommensalternativen verfolgen wie eine abhängige Beschäftigung, eine neue Selbststän-
digkeit oder den Ruhestand. Die Überlegung, eine andere Einkommensalternative zu ver-
folgen, ist von Kostenüberlegungen beeinflusst: geringe Opportunitäts- oder hohe Wech-
selkosten erhöhen dabei die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass Unternehmer ihre gegenwärtige 
Selbstständigkeit weiterführen – möglicherweise länger als dies ratsam ist, was die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit erhöhen würde, dass eine Schließung mit finanziellen Verlusten ein-
hergeht. Im Gegensatz zur Gruppe freiwilliger Unternehmensschließungen, ist ein Zu-
sammenhang zwischen Schließungen, die auf Insolvenz oder andere finanzielle Probleme 
zurückzuführen sind, und der Wahrscheinlichkeit finanzieller Verluste bei Schließung of-
fensichtlich. Schließungen durch Insolvenz oder aufgrund anderer finanzieller Probleme 
dürften daher grundsätzlich die Wahrscheinlichkeit finanzieller Verluste erhöhen. 
 Aufgrund unterschiedlicher Beziehungen zu einem Unternehmen sind Gläubiger 
unterschiedlichen Risiken ausgesetzt, einen finanziellen Verlust bei Unternehmensschlie-
ßung zu erleiden. Diese Risiken hängen beispielsweise von bestehenden Informationsa-
symmetrien ab oder davon, welche Maßnahmen die Gläubiger unternehmen, um Infor-
mationsdefiziten zu begegnen. Theoretische Überlegungen deuten darauf hin, dass das 
Risiko finanzieller Verluste auch mit den Gründen für die Schließung zusammenhängt. Die 
zentrale Forschungsfrage in diesem Papier lautet daher zu untersuchen, wie sich die 
Gründe für eine Unternehmensschließung darauf auswirken, wer finanzielle Verluste bei 
einer Unternehmensschließung erleidet. 
 Die Analysen auf Basis der ZEW Gründerstudie zeigen, dass Unternehmensschlie-
ßungen aufgrund einer unzureichenden erwarteten Unternehmensentwicklung oder weil 
Unternehmer eine andere Einkommensalternative verfolgen wollten mit einem verringer-
ten Risiko finanzieller Verluste für Gläubiger einhergehen. Demgegenüber sind Schlie-
ßungen aufgrund finanzieller Probleme für alle Beteiligte mit einem erhöhten Risiko für 
Verluste verbunden. 
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Abstract 
This paper explores how different reasons for business closure impact the probability that 
financial loss will be suffered by creditors. Using German small business data, the study 
finds that business closure due to financial problems is strongly correlated with a likeli-
hood of financial loss. By contrast, closures that take place based on expectations about 
a business’ future development or because the owner takes a different earning opportu-
nity are less likely to entail losses for creditors. The findings suggest that creditors are 
better off when entrepreneurs have a clear picture of their own abilities and shortcom-
ings, and don’t suffer from all-too-frequent over-optimism. Consequently, creditors stand 
to gain from helping clients to assess financial prospects. 
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Introduction 
Nearly 40% of business ventures in Germany (Brüderl et al. 1992, Harhoff et al. 1998, 
Wagner 1999) and about 60% of new firms in the US (Nucci 1999) and Portugal (Mata et 
al. 1995) shut down within the first five years of their establishment. This high failure 
rate, in conjunction with imperfect and asymmetric information problems (Berger and 
Udell 1998), has led new businesses to be widely financed by insiders, i.e. owners, family 
or friends while banks are cautious about lending money for business ventures. This cau-
tion has called forth two responses: public-sector banks try to make funding available 
through special lending programs for entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, small firms try them-
selves to overcome credit constraints by using alternative financing sources such as trade 
credits (Danielson and Scott 2004).  
 The high closure rates among start-ups, however, actually exaggerates the finan-
cial risk to parties that have a financial stake in the business (i.e. owners, lending institu-
tions and other creditors, such as suppliers): not all start-ups cease operations with a 
financial loss (Everett and Watson 1998), nor does closure – in the event of loss –
 necessarily entail financial loss for every party. Theoretical arguments suggest that the 
reasons for closure affect this financial risk. The central purpose of this paper is thus to 
test how different reasons for business closure determine who suffers financial loss at 
closure. Aside from financial problems, frequent reasons for closure are that the business 
no longer met the owner’s objectives (Stokes and Blackburn 2001) or that the owner 
transitioned to salaried employment (Taylor 1999). 
 Using data from a unique dataset on business closures in Germany, we deter-
mined – after controlling for business characteristics – that closures that take place 
based on expectations about a business’ future development or because the owner takes 
a different earning opportunity are less likely to entail losses for creditors. Conversely, 
businesses that cease operations because of financial problems are correlated with a 
higher probability of loss for involved parties. 
Financial loss at business closure: theory and empirics 
The number of businesses that cease operations due to bankruptcy or with financial loss 
for creditors is lower than the number of business closures with loss for the own-
ers (Watson and Everett 1993). However, Dennis and Fernald (2001) find that former 
business owners are more likely to end up with a net gain than loss when closing a busi-
ness. This conclusion is based on a survey of businesses that were closed, sold, trans-
ferred or became inactive. For businesses which are closed, the odds of gain or loss for 
the entrepreneur are nearly equal. Hamilton (2000) has shown that entrepreneurs have 
lower initial earnings, experience lower earnings’ growth and are less likely to have 
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health insurance compared to salaried workers. In short, these studies all find that en-
trepreneurs face significant financial risks. 
 Given this high risk, Xu and Ruef (2004) conclude that many individuals start their 
own business based on non-pecuniary motives. Indeed, Westhead and Wright (1998) 
show that non-pecuniary factors, such as the need for independence or the need for ap-
proval, play a major role. Entrepreneurs who want to achieve non-pecuniary benefits are 
likely to take lower financial risks when compared with entrepreneurs who try to achieve 
high profitability (Xu and Ruef 2004). This would indicate that businesses whose owners 
seek non-pecuniary goals are subject to a lower risk of financial loss. At a first glance, 
this is supported by Headd (2003), who suggests that owners who start a business for 
lifestyle reasons (i.e. non-pecuniary motives) have less at stake and can more readily 
close their business down compared to businesses that are launched with ambitious 
growth strategies. However, Headd (2003) does argue that entrepreneurs pursuing non-
pecuniary goals may be more likely to hold onto the business until it completely fails. 
Nevertheless, he also suggests that many owners – regardless of the reasons for their 
business venture – have a planned exit strategy, i.e. to sell the business or cease opera-
tions before losses or excessive debts pile up. 
 An exit strategy is nothing more than a “Plan B” for action as soon as particular 
circumstances occur. Owing to its predictability, closures that are planned may be less 
likely to entail financial loss than businesses that are closed for other reasons. Of course, 
this does not mean that planned closings are never accompanied by financial problems or 
loss. The probability of loss at closure associated with planned exits may be a function of 
costs. We can expect the entrepreneur decides to terminate the business based on the 
same information as the decision to venture relied on: the expected future net returns 
from self-employment (Evans and Jovanovic 1989). If the predicted utility of alternative 
employment, minus the cost inherent in switching, exceeds the predicted utility of re-
maining in the entrepreneurial venture – including the psychic income from entrepre-
neurship – entrepreneurs will close their business (Gimeno et al. 1997). This means that 
low opportunity or high switching costs increase the probability of staying in a business –
 possibly longer than advisable which, as a consequence, predict a higher likelihood of 
financial loss at closure. A high psychic income – influenced, for example, by the individ-
ual's preference for the occupation, or personal satisfaction (Evans and Leighton 1989) 
as argued by Headd (2003) – implies similar consequences.  
 Closures often occur because owners take opportunities which guarantee alterna-
tive earnings; a transition to salaried employment (e.g. Taylor 1999), alternative self-
employment or retirement indicates that there were high opportunity costs in staying in 
the business. Such reasons are thus less likely to be associated with financial loss at clo-
sure. However, older individuals may have less time to recoup the costs associated with 
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switching jobs (Gimeno et al. 1997), which let switching costs appear relatively higher for 
them. Because of the start-up costs for a new firm, switching costs may also be high for 
entrepreneurs who close a business in order to start a new one. Because entrepreneurs 
who are faced with high switching costs may be more likely to hold onto the business 
longer than advisable, reasons like retirement or restarting are probably associated with 
an increased likelihood of financial loss at closure. With regard to entrepreneurs who are 
near retirement age, Frank (1988) argues that they are likely to work less hard, having 
“nothing left to prove.” This may cause slack management why closure due to retirement 
may be associated with an increased probability of financial loss. However, entrepreneurs 
who have realized that their strategy is not viable or who foresee the market exit due to 
retirement may also actively prepare for the closure. If entrepreneurs reduce capacity in 
the years prior to closure, then, there will be less at stake why such closures may be less 
likely to entail financial loss. Either actively prepared or due to slack management where 
businesses perform poorly and lose employees there may the “shadow of death sneaking 
around the corner” (Almus 2004) 
 In contrast to voluntary closures without economic pressure, the link between 
closures due to bankruptcy or other financial problems and financial loss is obvious. Ac-
cording to the German Federal Statistical Office, businesses that filed for bankruptcy in 
1993–1999 left behind 15 to 20 billion euros in outstanding debts per year. Our own cal-
culations based on available rates from insolvency proceedings in 2004–2007 suggest 
that young businesses up to the age of eight years are responsible for more than one-
third of these outstanding debts, and that businesses up to three years of age are ac-
countable for one-half of this third. This means that each business up to eight years of 
age filing for bankruptcy has outstanding debts of 330 to 470 thousand euros on aver-
age. By contrast, bankrupt businesses up to three years of age have outstanding debts of 
410 to 570 thousand euros on average. However, these average values are biased by a 
few ventures with heavy losses. While more than 40% of all young businesses filing for 
bankruptcy have outstanding debts between 50 to 250 thousand euros, between 25% 
and 33% have outstanding debts of only 5 to 50 thousand euros. By definition insolven-
cies are caused by serious financial problems. Consequently, business closures by bank-
ruptcy are more likely to be associated with high financial loss when compared with vol-
untary closures. 
 Owing to their different relationships to a business, creditors are subject to vary-
ing probabilities of incurring financial loss. These probabilities depend, for example, in 
part on informational asymmetries, as not all creditors are privy to the same information 
about the business and the measures used by these creditors to treat their information 
deficit. Owners may be well informed about the firm’s condition, but they might not share 
this information with creditors. However, some creditors are more informed than others: 
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thanks to audit rights, lending banks seem to have an advantage over other creditors. 
Yet trade creditors such as suppliers have information with greater relevance for a firm’s 
current situation if they offer contractual payment terms with credit options: late pay-
ments instead of taking cash discounts can be an indication that a buyer is faced with 
liquidity problems (Smith 1987). Owners who start their business as a limited liability 
corporation are partly protected from financial risks. For this reason, lending banks often 
require collateral and personal guarantees from owners as a condition for loan approval. 
Trade creditors cannot achieve this level of protection but usually secure their claims by 
conditional sales. However, because buyers put goods into use, process them, or simply 
unwrap and store them, the repossession of the delivered goods is often not worth it. 
Data and methodology 
Data 
This article examines the relationships between reasons for business closure and the like-
lihood of financial loss upon closure using a unique dataset in Germany called the ZEW 
Entrepreneurship Study. In the study, a telephone survey of German businesses estab-
lished in 1990–1993 was conducted between March 1999 and March 2000 (see Almus 
2004 for details). Data were collected on businesses that were currently active and those 
which had been closed. The owners of defunct businesses were queried on the reasons 
for closure, whether financial loss had occurred and which of the parties with a financial 
stake in the business (i.e. owners, lending institutions1 and other creditors, such as sup-
pliers) had suffered a loss, among other things. Of a total 3,000 businesses, 835 had 
been closed. Financial loss arose in 539 of these closures: 509 closures entailed financial 
losses for owners, 181 closures entailed financial losses for lending institutions and 255 
closures entailed financial loss for other creditors such as suppliers. 
Variables  
We used a trivariate probit model to analyze the determinants of who suffers financial 
loss at closure. This model estimates three probit regressions, one per party considered, 
allowing correlations among the residuals of the single regressions. Such a multivariate 
probit model is necessary because financial loss can be incurred by the different parties 
simultaneously and possibly be interrelated. The dependent variables of the particular 
probit regressions were coded as “1” if business closure entails financial loss for the re-
spective party; “0” otherwise. 
                                          
1 Lending institutions include banks and public institutions, the latter being in most cases publicly owned devel-
opment banks. In the 1990s the most important development bank for start-ups in Germany was Deutsche 
Ausgleichsbank, which was merged with Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau to form KfW Mittelstandsbank in 2003. 
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 The independent variables were divided into two groups: (1) reasons for closure, 
and (2) business characteristics. Eight different reasons for closure relying on self-
reporting by the entrepreneurs were defined (allowing for multiple answers): excessive 
debts; liquidity problems; the business was recognized as unrewarding in the long term; 
move into salaried employment; fresh start with a different business; differences within 
the entrepreneurial team; move into retirement; and private or other reasons. We distin-
guished between liquidity problems and excessive debts in order to account for varying 
financial problems: excessive debts are usually the outcome of long- or medium-term 
mismanagement, and are thus long-lasting and serious in nature; liquidity problems, on 
the other hand, often occur at relatively short notice – for example, due to a loss of re-
ceivables.  
 We also developed a bankruptcy indicator to more accurately assess the nature of 
financial problems. As opposed to reasons for closure, this indicator relied on official data 
concerning insolvency proceedings. In Germany, businesses could only file for bank-
ruptcy if their financial problems prevent the payment of debts as they fall due (insol-
vency/Zahlungsunfähigkeit) and/or where it can be established that the value of assets is 
less than liabilities (over-indebtedness/Überschuldung). With regard to German law, one 
must bear in mind that corporations have an obligation to file for bankruptcy if good 
cause exists. This means that some unincorporated businesses may delay filing for bank-
ruptcy until their financial problems become much worse than incorporated businesses 
who file early due to legal obligations. However, one can assume that if cause for bank-
ruptcy is given, but business owners or directors do not file, then creditors will eventually 
force involuntary bankruptcy proceedings. Control variables on regional firm location, 
industry affiliation and closure year were also included in the regressions. 
 Table 1 provides variable definitions and summary statistics. On average, a “typi-
cal” firm in the sample was started as a portfolio company by a self-financing entrepre-
neurial team with a total capital of 63 thousand euros (median: 25 thousand euros) and 
unlimited liability. It ceased operation voluntarily – i.e. didn’t go into bankruptcy – after 
4 years while employing nearly 13 employees (median: 4 employees). 64% of the sam-
ple closed with a loss, whereby 60% entailed financial loss for the owners, 21% for lend-
ing institutions and 30% for other creditors. Firms closing with a financial loss typically 
started as a limited company, had liquidity problems, went bankrupt and were larger 
than closures without loss. Businesses which led to a financial loss particularly for credi-
tors were the largest in average size. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: mean of determinants 
All samples Financial loss for … 
 … owners … lending 
institutions 
… other 
creditors 
Variable Definition 
(N = 845) (N = 510) (N = 182) (N = 254) 
Reasons for closurea,b     
DEBTS Excessive debts (0/1) 0.23 0.33 0.47 0.43 
LIQUIDITY Liquidity problems (0/1) 0.44 0.61 0.70 0.74 
UNREWARD Business was recognized as unrewarding in the 
long term (0/1) 0.38 0.38 0.25 0.27 
DISPUTE Disputes within the entrepreneurial team (0/1, this 
variable has to be interpreted as an interaction 
term with the TEAM indicator) 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.12 
EMPLOY Entrepreneurs moved into salaried employ-
ment (0/1) 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 
RESTART Entrepreneurs started a different business (0/1) 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.07 
RETIRE Entrepreneur went into retirement (0/1) 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 
PRIVOTH Private or other reasons (0/1) 0.32 0.25 0.27 0.23 
BNKRPT Business went bankrupt (0/1) 0.42 0.52 0.68 0.73 
Business characteristics     
PORT Business was portfolio firm, i.e. entrepreneur 
owned other firm(s) (0/1) 0.52 0.55 0.50 0.57 
CAPITAL Amount of total start-up capital (in ‘000 €) 62.59 70.98 85.03 82.89 
SELFFIN  Start-up capital was fully self-financed (0/1) 0.68 0.67 0.54 0.62 
CAPM Information on capital is not available (0/1) 0.35 0.31 0.37 0.30 
TEAM Entrepreneur team (0/1) 0.74 0.79 0.78 0.80 
LIMITED Limited liability company (0/1) 0.48 0.53 0.54 0.64 
SIZE # of employees at firm closure 12.59 13.11 19.08 18.04 
SIZEM SIZE is not available (0/1) 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07 
AGE Age of the closed firm (in years) 4.38 4.38 4.57 4.42 
AGEM AGE is not available (0/1) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
a Multiple responses possible. b Apart from BNKRPT, which is based on public official information, all closure 
reasons rely on the self-reporting of the interviewees. 
With regard to the reported financial risks for parties who have a financial stake in the 
business, similar results are found by Brüderl et al. (1992). In their study, 53% of foun-
ders who went out of business ended up with personal financial loss and 14% of all clos-
ings entailed financial loss for others. Similar findings are also presented by Dennis and 
Fernald (2001), who show that entrepreneurs who close their business are faced with 
nearly equal odds of having made a gain or loss. 
Irrespective of the occurrence of financial loss, economic problems are the most 
crucial factor in business closure. Excessive debts played a role in almost a quarter of the 
surveyed closures, while 44% reported liquidity issues (meaning this latter problem was 
nearly twice as common). However, the share of companies with excessive debts or li-
quidity problems is with 33% and 61% unsurprisingly much higher among those compa-
nies which closed with a loss. The realization by the owners that the business was unre-
warding in the long term was relevant in 38% of cases. A further reason for closure was 
dispute within the entrepreneurial team – a problem which accounted for 13% of all clo-
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sures. Not all businesses had an entrepreneurial team, however: among those that did, 
this reason accounted for approximately 18% of closures. With regard to all closures, the 
pursuit of career change was also a less essential reason. About 5% of the closures oc-
curred because entrepreneurs moved to salaried employment; 10% started a different 
business. Owners finishing their entrepreneurial career by retiring accounted for 4% of 
cases. Finally, the termination of operations related to unspecified private or other rea-
sons was attributable to 32% of closures. 
 The 5% share of owners moving into alternative employment found here is evi-
dently smaller than that reported by Taylor (1999), where nearly a third of all owners 
who started a business in the 1990s left self-employment because they started a job. 
This higher share may reflect the fact that Taylor (1999) considers the duration of self-
employment spells rather than the condition of firms as we do. If owners withdraw from 
a business it doesn’t necessarily mean the end of the business.  
Results 
Table 2 shows the correlations among the reasons for closure. Given dichotomous indica-
tors, the variables have moderate correlations, ranging from -0.31 to 0.39. Since multi-
ple responses were possible one might be concerned about multicollinearity among them. 
This holds true particularly with regard to variables associated with financial problems 
since they are often closely related to one other. For example, businesses having exces-
sive debts are likely to be faced with liquidity problems. Excessive debts as well as liquid-
ity problems are, in addition, legal causes for the filing of bankruptcy. Indeed, the 
strongest positive correlations exist between bankruptcy and liquidity problems (r = 
0.39), liquidity problems and excessive debts (r = 0.33) as well as excessive debts and 
bankruptcy (r = 0.22). The strongest negative correlations are found between private or 
other reasons and liquidity problems (r = -0.31) as well as that the business was recog-
nized unrewarding (r = -0.25). All other correlations are weaker. To ensure that multicol-
linearity doesn’t affect the regression results, multicollinearity diagnoses were applied to 
all regression analyses.2 
                                          
2 Both the variance inflation factor (VIF) and the condition number of the correlation matrix are multicollinearity 
diagnosis measures. An examination of the VIF with regard to reasons for closure included in the estimation 
suggests that there was no incidence of multicollinearity. Individual figures range from 1.02 to 1.40, which is 
well below critical values (see Hair et al. 1998). The condition number computed from the correlation matrix 
without a constant is 1.92 with regard to the reasons for closure and 11.68 when all independent variables are 
included. 
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Table 2: Correlations among reasons for closure 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 DEBTS 1.00                 
2 LIQUIDITY 0.33*** 1.00               
3 UNREWARD -0.05 -0.10*** 1.00             
4 DISPUTE 0.06* 0.03 -0.08** 1.00           
5 EMPLOY 0.00 0.03 0.06* -0.06 * 1.00         
6 RESTART -0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 1.00       
7 RETIRE -0.09** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.06 * 0.00 -0.03 1.00     
8 PRIVOTH -0.14*** -0.31*** -0.25*** -0.09 *** -0.02 -0.08 ** 0.00 1.00   
9 BNKRPT 0.22*** 0.39*** -0.17*** -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 ** -0.03 -0.13*** 1.00 *** 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
Table 3 shows the trivariate probit model that examines the determinants of who suffers 
financial loss at closure. The probability that a closure entails financial loss for owners is 
reported in column (1), to lending institutions in column (2), and to other creditors in 
column (3). Examination of the cross equation error terms, reported in the lower part of 
the table, which all are highly significant positive, suggests that the risk of financial loss 
at closure is positively correlated among the parties who have a financial stake in the 
business. The risk correlation is highest between the creditor groups. This means that if 
lending institutions incur financial loss it is likely that other creditors incur a loss, too. 
The high significance of the cross equation error terms confirms the appropriateness of 
using a trivariate probit model afterwards. All probit estimates include dummy variables 
representing regional firm location, industry affiliation and closure year. 
 The likelihood that a closure entails financial loss for owners increases if busi-
nesses are closed due to financial distress. Excessive debts increase the loss risk by 24% 
and liquidity problems by about 31%. Bankruptcy is related with a loss risk of 12%. The 
latter effect can be considered as a minimum risk level since most bankrupt firms have 
excessive debts and/or liquidity problems. Conversely, if a business was closed because 
the owner retired, the risk of financial loss decreases by 23%. Other reasons for clo-
sure (business was recognized as unrewarding in the long term; differences within the 
entrepreneur team; move into wage employment; restart with a different business; pri-
vate or other reasons) are unrelated to the likelihood of a financial loss for owners. Model 
1 also shows that the probability of financial loss is positively associated with the amount 
of total start-up capital and entrepreneurial teams.  
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Table 3: Determinants of financial loss at business closure  
(1) 
Loss for owners 
(2) 
Loss for banks or 
public institutions 
(3) 
Loss for other 
creditors 
 
Marg. Eff.a Std. Err. Marg. Eff.a Std. Err. Marg. Eff.a Std. Err. 
Circumstances of closureb,c 
DEBTS 0.235 *** 0.041 0.171 *** 0.037 0.200 *** 0.042 
LIQUIDITY 0.306 *** 0.040 0.127 *** 0.031 0.203 *** 0.037 
UNREWARD 0.048  0.043 -0.077 *** 0.029 -0.072 ** 0.036 
DISPUTE 0.050  0.056 -0.021  0.038 -0.045  0.045 
EMPLOY 0.036  0.083 0.039  0.068 0.146  0.091 
RESTART 0.067  0.060 -0.071 * 0.040 -0.074  0.052 
RETIRE -0.231 ** 0.109 -0.072  0.056 -0.159 *** 0.058 
PRIVOTH -0.007  0.045 0.017  0.032 -0.009  0.039 
BNKRPT 0.117 *** 0.045 0.169 *** 0.034 0.236 *** 0.039 
Business characteristics 
PORT 0.022  0.041 -0.049 * 0.029 0.015  0.035 
CAPITAL, log 0.043 *** 0.014 0.009  0.009 0.001  0.011 
SELFFIN 0.059  0.053 -0.079 ** 0.036 -0.052  0.045 
CAPM 0.094  0.072 -0.002  0.052 -0.066  0.060 
TEAM 0.113 ** 0.051 0.040  0.033 0.009  0.044 
LIMITED -0.077  0.048 -0.061 * 0.034 0.020  0.041 
SIZE, log -0.013  0.019 0.012  0.013 0.035 ** 0.016 
SIZEM -0.149 * 0.081 0.030  0.062 0.061  0.076 
AGE -0.018  0.016 -0.022 * 0.012 -0.031 ** 0.015 
AGEM 0.207  0.155 -0.106  0.066 0.044  0.198 
Control variablesd  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Rho21 Rho31 Rho32 Correlations of the cross equation 
error terms  0.51 ***  0.57 ***  0.72 ***  
LR test chi2 e 195.81 ***        
# of observations 847         
Wald test chi2 (df) 195.56 (34)        
Log pseudolikelihood -1,062.86         
The likelihood modeled by trivariate probit3 is FL = 1 for each party considered respectively. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.   
a The marginal effects for continuous variables are calculated at the sample means. b No reference category 
because multiple responses possible. c Apart from BNKRPT, which is based on public official information, all 
closure reasons rely on the self-reporting of the interviewees. d Not reported here, but available on request 
from the author, are the results of the control variables. e LR test chi2 of rho21 = rho31 = rho32 = 0. 
Model 2 estimates the probability that a closure entails financial loss on lending institu-
tions. Again, the results show financial loss is more likely if businesses were closed due 
to financial distress. Excessive debts and liquidity problems are associated with an 17% 
and 13% higher loss risk, respectively, while bankruptcy increases the risk of financial 
loss by 17%. The effects accompanying liquidity problems and bankruptcy are signifi-
cantly different to those found for owners. In contrast to Model 1, retirement is unrelated 
                                          
3 The trivariate probit regression is estimated with STATA using the user-written command “cmp” introduced in 
2007 by David Roodman, http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456882.html. Cmp is a Stata module to imple-
ment a conditional (recursive) mixed process estimator. For estimation problems like a trivariate probit, cmp 
uses maximum simulated likelihood (MSL). Here, the MSL is based on 10,000 draws of pseudo-random stan-
dard uniform variates and should thus be consistent. 
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to financial loss. Businesses that were closed because the entrepreneur recognized the 
business was unrewarding in the long term or, though only weakly significant, because 
they started a different business are less likely to result in financial loss for lending insti-
tutions. The loss risk is lowered by 8% and 7%, respectively. Other reasons for clo-
sure (differences within the entrepreneurial team; move into wage employment; private 
or other reasons) are unrelated to financial loss for lending institutions. Moreover, Model 
2 shows that financial loss is less likely for businesses fully self-financed by the owner 
and, though only weakly significant, for portfolio firms and limited companies. Whether 
the start-up capital was fully self-financed by the owner tells us if banks were initially 
involved in financing the business. The associated indicator thus controls for the possibil-
ity that banks suffer loss. However, the involvement of banks in a business can change 
from start-up to closure. 
 The probability that a closure entails financial loss for other creditors also in-
creases with financial distress. The increased risk of financial loss associated with exces-
sive debts and liquidity problems is 20% either, while bankruptcy raises this risk by 24%. 
By contrast, reasons such as recognizing the business as unrewarding in the long term (-
7%) and retirement (-16%) Other reasons for closure (differences within the entrepre-
neurial team; move into wage employment; restart with a different business; private or 
other reasons) are unrelated to financial loss for lending institutions. Model 3 also shows 
that the likelihood of financial loss is positively associated with the number of employees 
at closure. 
 The analysis shows that businesses which closed with financial problems are more 
likely associated with loss to the parties who had a financial stake in the business than 
others. However, there are differences with regard to the kind of financial distress con-
sidered. The risk of incurring financial loss at closure due to excessive debts is roughly 
similar for the three parties considered, while liquidity problems are less likely to entail 
loss for lending institutions than others. Excessive debts are indicative of far-reaching 
financial distress which may well exhaust the resources of both the business and owner. 
Liquidity problems are different, however. They can occur quickly, with little warning. For 
this reason, the owners of companies closed due to liquidity problems are more likely to 
have remaining financial resources at closure which can be used to service the claims of 
creditors such as banks, who generally are secured best and have thus first priority in a 
liquidation. Other creditors, such as suppliers, may try to satisfy their claims by repos-
sessing goods if they have a retention of title, or by obtaining an executory title against 
the business or its owner. However, shipped goods often have a lower value and the 
amounts outstanding can be so low that such measures may not be worth the trouble. 
 Compared to voluntary business closure, bankruptcy is naturally associated with a 
higher risk of loss. However, owners are less likely to incur financial loss than creditors. 
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This can be explained by the bankruptcy proceeding itself, which protects debtors against 
the direct access of creditors. In the case of voluntary closure, secured creditors can di-
rectly dispose over the companies’ or owners’ assets, thus protecting themselves against 
loss. There is also no rush for a secured creditor to lay claim to assets, since its execu-
tion right against a debtor remains in force either (in case of limited liability) as long as 
the legal entity exists or (in case of unlimited liability) for thirty years (i.e. somewhere in 
the range of the debtor’s remaining life expectancy).4 The opening of a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, however, prevents creditors from directly laying claim to the debtor’s estate. 
Instead, creditors have to register their claims, and if they fail to do so, they forfeit their 
right to recovery as soon as the bankruptcy proceeding ends. Thus, compared to volun-
tary closure, bankruptcy makes it more likely that creditors will come away empty-
handed. A further reason for the higher risk of loss is that the costs of a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding are privileged against other claims, thereby reducing the bankruptcy estate and 
the settlement received by creditors. In light of the foregoing, it is clear that creditors 
have little interest in seeing their debtors file for bankruptcy. 
 Aside from results obtained by looking at the causes of financial distress, another 
interesting finding is that businesses which were closed because they were recognized as 
unrewarding in the long term are less likely to entail financial loss for creditors (both 
lending institutions and other creditors). This confirms the well-known exhortation of 
what an entrepreneur should do based on their experience: learn about his or her own 
abilities and shortcomings (Jovanovic 1982), and refrain from pursuing the venture if the 
expected future net returns from self-employment are negative (Gimeno et al. 1997). 
Furthermore, businesses which closed because the owner wanted to start a different 
business are associated with a lower risk of financial loss for creditors. An explanation for 
this finding may be that owners who want to pursue a fresh start are dependent on good 
relations with creditors since these creditors may be important for financing the new 
business. This argument is supported by the fact that entrepreneurs have a much lower 
likelihood of starting a new business if they previously caused lending institutions to incur 
a loss (Metzger 2008). Entrepreneurs pursuing a fresh start who avoid sticking creditors 
with the bill for their previous venture act not only in the interest of creditors but also in 
their own interest. A lower risk of financial loss is also associated with business closures 
that take place due to retirement. Here it would seem that entrepreneurs planning for 
retirement have ample opportunity to wind down their business without producing losses.  
                                          
4 This holds for the German Bankruptcy Act (Konkursordnung) and Collective Enforcement Act (Gesamtvoll-
streckungsordnung) which governed bankruptcies in West and East Germany until 1999. In 1999 the German 
Insolvency Act (Insolvenzordnung) was enacted. With it, the possibility of debt release (Restschuldbefreiung) 
after a period of continuing good behavior was introduced. 
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 Some of the effects found in the analysis do not confirm the effects initially pre-
dicted by the cost considerations. Closures by retiring entrepreneurs are not associated 
with a higher risk of loss. By contrast, closures due to a move into paid employment 
make financial loss for other creditors more likely. These findings show that the influence 
of the psychic income from entrepreneurship may be more important than expected: 
entrepreneurs pursuing a fresh start may be interested in creating good conditions for a 
new business; retiring entrepreneurs may be interested in bringing a life’s work to a good 
end; or, entrepreneurs consider self-employment as a transitory state between periods of 
salaried employment (Taylor 1999), in which simply earning a living prior is the key 
aim – regardless of a potentially negative bottom line. 
Conclusions 
Do all new businesses survive? The answer, of course, is "No." Are business closures 
synonymous with financial disaster? The answer here is also generally "No," although this 
does not mean that financial losses are rare. In this paper we conducted an empirical 
analysis of German small business data to test how different reasons for business closure 
affect who suffers financial loss. It was found that businesses closures due to financial 
problems are strongly correlated with a risk of financial loss for all parties considered. 
However, in case of bankruptcy, creditors are faced with a higher risk of financial loss 
than owners. By contrast, closures that take place based on expectations about a busi-
ness’ future development or because the owner takes a different earning opportunity are 
less likely to entail losses for creditors. 
 These findings have important implications for both creditors and entrepreneurs. 
Often entrepreneurs hold onto a business until it completely fails through bankruptcy. 
Entrepreneurs ability to judge and forecast “suffers” from their overconfidence (Hograth 
and Makridakis 1981). For obvious reasons, creditors have little interest in seeing the 
bankruptcy of their debtors. Creditors thus stand to gain from undertaking interventions 
designed to help clients to diminish overconfidence. Lending banks – which have a good 
insight into the books of their debtors – should, for example, discuss latent business 
problems as early as possible with creditors rather than waiting until their collateral is at 
risk. An early intervention can not only avoid bankruptcy but may put entrepreneurs in a 
position to make perceived business prospects more congruent with the business devel-
opment being likely. Due to the risk advantage associated with closures based on the 
entrepreneurs’ recognition that the business is unrewarding in the long term, this is an 
advisable course of action for creditors. Entrepreneurs, as well, stand to gain from learn-
ing how to better appraise the health of their business, not only to prevent incurring 
losses themselves, but also – and more particularly – if they hope to pursue a new busi-
ness venture. Research shows that when an entrepreneur has caused lending institutions 
to suffer a financial loss, he has a much worse chance of a fresh start (Metzger 2008). 
 12 
 13 
References 
Almus, M. 2004. The Shadow of Death – An Empirical Analysis of the Pre-Exit Perform-
ance of New German Firms. Small Business Economics 23(3): 189-201. 
Berger, A.N. and G.F. Udell. 1998. The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Roles 
of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle. Journal of Bank-
ing & Finance 22(6-8): 613-673. 
Brüderl, J., P. Preisendörfer and R. Ziegler. 1992. Survival Chances Of Newly Founded 
Business Organizations. American Sociological Review 57: 227-242. 
Danielson, M.G. and J.A. Scott. 2004. Bank Loan Availability and Trade Credit Demand. 
The Financial Review 39(4): 579--600. 
Dennis, W.J. and L.W. Fernald. 2001. The Chances of Financial Success (and Loss) from 
Small Business Ownership. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 26(1): 75-83. 
Evans, D.S. and B. Jovanovic. 1989. An Estimated Model of Entrepreneurial Choice Under 
Liquidity Constraints. Journal of Political Economy 97(4): 808-827. 
Evans, D.S. and L.S. Leighton. 1989. Some Empirical Aspects of Entrepreneurship. The 
American Economic Review 79(3): 519-535. 
Everett, J. and J. Watson. 1998. Small Business Failure and External Risk Factors. Small 
Business Economics 11: 371-390. 
Frank, M.Z. 1988. An Intertemporal Model of Industrial Exit. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 103(2): 333-44. 
Gimeno, J., T.B. Folta, A.C. Cooper and C.Y. Woo. 1997. Survival of the Fittest? Entre-
preneurial Human Capital and the Persistence of Underperforming Firms. Adminis-
trative Science Quarterly 42: 750-783. 
Hair, J.F., R.E. Anderson, R.L. Tatham and W.C. Black. 1998. Multivariate Data Analysis 
with Readings 5. Prentice Hall  (Englewood Cliffs, NJ). 
Hamilton, B.H. 2000. Does Entrepreneurship Pay? An Empirical Analysis of the Returns to 
Self-Employment. Journal of Political Economy 108(3): 604-631. 
Harhoff, D., K. Stahl and M. Woywode. 1998. Legal Form, Growth and Exit of West Ger-
man Firms - Empirical Results for Manufacturing, Construction, Trade and Service 
Industries. The Journal of Industrial Economics 46(4): 453-488. 
Headd, B. 2003. Redefining Business Success: Distinguishing between Closure and Fail-
ure. Small Business Economics 21: 51-61. 
Hograth, R.M. and S. Makridakis. 1981. Forecasting and Planning: An Evaluation. Man-
agement Science 27(2): 115-138. 
Jovanovic, B. 1982. Selection and the Evolution of Industry. Econometrica 50(3): 649-
670. 
Mata, J., P. Portugal and P. Guimaraes. 1995. The Survival of New Plants: Start-up Con-
ditions and Post-entry Evolution. International Journal of Industrial Organization 
13: 459-481. 
Metzger, G. 2008. Firm Closure, Financial Losses, and the Consequences for an Entrepre-
neurial Restart. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 08-094. Mannheim. 
Nucci, A. 1999. The Demography of Business Closings. Small Business Economics 12(1): 
25-29. 
Smith, J.K. 1987. Trade Credit and Information Asymmetry. The Journal of Finance 
42(4): 863-872. 
Stokes, D. and R. Blackburn. 2001. Opening up Business Closures: a Study of Businesses 
that Close and Owners' Exit Routes. Kingston University. Kingston Hill. 
Taylor, M.P. 1999. Survival of the Fittest? An Analysis of Self-employment Duration in 
Britain. The Economic Journal 109(454): C140-C155. 
Wagner, J. 1999. The Life History of Cohorts of Exits from German Manufacturing. Small 
Business Economics 13: 71-79. 
Watson, J. and J. Everett. 1993. Defining Small Business Failure. International Small 
Business Journal 11(3): 35-48. 
Westhead, P. and M. Wright. 1998. Novice, Portfolio, and Serial Founders in Rural and 
Urban Areas. Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice 22(4): 63-100. 
Xu, H. and M. Ruef. 2004. The Myth of the Risk-Tolerant Entrepreneur. Strategic Organi-
zation 2(4): 331-355. 
